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AN EXECUTIVE'S LESSON IN THE LAW FROM
A TYPICAL BUSINESS ENCOUNTER
Harold A. Segall*
Introduction
This is the first article in a series prompted by the difficulties that
businesspeople in the United States face when operating within the
framework of an unsatisfactory civil legal system. A hypothetical
situation relating to the collection of a delinquent account receiva-
ble is employed to demonstrate the recommendation that execu-
tives should consider potential legal problems when entering into
business transactions.
Part I of this article provides examples bf the perils of litigation
and explains that business executives can try to avoid these perils
by anticipating potential legal problems. As an illustration, Part II
outlines a particular delinquent account receivable problem and
lists the questions a business executive is likely to ask a lawyer
when choosing between settlement and litigation. Part III sets out
the likely answers to these questions and reviews the issues to be
addressed in a settlement agreement. This article concludes that
the delinquent account receivable problem, like a number of other
business-legal problems, can be averted or mitigated if the execu-
tive anticipates the difficulty and takes the indicated precautions.
I. The Unsatisfactory State of the Civil Legal System
The practice of law over fifty years has demonstrated to me that
the successful business executive finds a way to balance his opti-
mistic, entrepreneurial spirit with a lawyerlike way of considering
potential future problems. Similarly, experience shows that the
proper role of a commercial lawyer, as part of the manage-
ment team, is to provide judgment and practical advice, as well
as legal expertise.' A good commercial lawyer focuses not on
* ©1996 Harold A. Segall, Senior Counsel, Gilbert, Segall and Young LLP; Vis-
iting Lecturer, 1974-75, Yale Law School, 1983-85, Yale School of Organization and
Management; B.A. 1938, Cornell University; LL.B. 1941, Yale Law School.
1. The author has conducted a seminar at the Yale Law School in contract draft-
ing and subsequently in each of three consecutive years devoted one day a week to
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a legal problem per se, but on the legal aspects of a business
problem.2
When a lawyer is consulted in connection with a contemplated
transaction, it is pointless to attempt to identify which aspects call
for commercial attention and which call for legal attention. A
lease, the purchase and sale of a business, an agreement with a
salesman or distributor or for the purchase and sale of goods, and
many other transactions present intertwining commercial and legal
considerations. The client and lawyer should work together as a
team on the assignment.3 Although the executive must make the
decision, both the client and the lawyer should focus on the same
question in many vital areas. Usually the client is not well advised
simply to turn over the negotiations and paper work to his or her
lawyer. The client should stay involved just the way he or she does
with an architect.4 If a new plant is to be designed and built, the
owner or executive should take the architect through the existing
plant and express his or her views as to its desirable features and
the features that can be improved for efficiency or economy or to
provide for the contemplated production capacity. The executive
should also stay involved during all stages-the concept and pre-
liminary plans, the final specifications, the letting of bids and the
construction. The same methodology should prevail in the lawyer-
client relationship, the degree of client involvement depending, of
course, on the nature and importance of the assignment.
Businessmen thinking like lawyers must consider that a court ac-
tion in this country typically is costly, slow and risky.5 The out-
2. If a lawyer for the first time in his career receives the assignment of negotiat-
ing a share-the-profits lease with a hotel chain on behalf of a client who will erect and
own the hotel, the lawyer would be well advised to read a book on hotel accounting
and to examine several leases covering similar arrangements, not only for his legal
education but also to gain an understanding of the commercial give and take between
the owner of the hotel and the operator, for example, over which party is to provide
the various inventories to be used in the hotel.
3. Joel F. Henning, A Legal Department Can Reorganize For Quality, 636 PLI/
Com. 55 (1992) ("What's important in a [total quality culture environment] is to
insure that lawyers work with clients as a team to make sure that the right questions
are asked.").
4. Whitney Gould, Architecture a "Gentleman's Club," STAR TRIB., Jan. 21, 1996,
at lE (quoting architecture professor Kathryn Anthony's assertion that architecture
schools should teach " 'co-creativity' ... in reflection of the collaboration that's essen-
tial between architects and clients"); Jane Adler, By Design; Bradford Elected Presi-
dent of Chicago Architects' Chapter; Touts Teamwork, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1995, at C3.
(quoting William Bradford's assertion that "[c]lients and architects need to work in
greater collaboration in the sense that all projects involve teams").
5. Thomas Masterson, ADR Has Evolved From Time Immemorial, PENN. LAW
WEEKLY, Nov. 13, 1995, at S2 ("CPR [National Panel of Distinguished Neutrals] con-
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come of a good portion of civil cases is as unpredictable as a game
of chance.6
Juries return verdicts that defy common sense and award stag-
gering damages. 7 A 1991 nationwide poll of people eligible for jury
duty found that 70% were more likely to favor an individual plain-
tiff over a corporate defendant before they knew anything at all
about the dispute.8 A key finding was that 60% of jurors deemed a
judgment for a million dollars " 'just a slap on the hand' for a cor-
poration, even though most understood that many jury verdicts are
too large."9
Punitive damages are imposed in routine cases with increasing
frequency. 10 For example, in 1993, an Alabama jury found that
Delta Woodside Industries had wrongfully denied a salesman and
two associates $852,118.00 in sales commissions. 1' The jury re-
turned a $29.1 million verdict, which broke down as follows: $2.6
million for breach of contract; $7 million for mental anguish; and
$19.5 million in punitive damages. 12
cluded that civil litigation was too slow and too costly .... "); Bradford W.
Hildebrandt, Planning Your Firm's Long-Term Future, THE CONN. LAW TRIB., July
19, 1993, at 23 ("The litigation process is too slow and costly for most clients.").
6. A federal judge in Brooklyn, in commenting on verdicts of $31 million in a
batch of asbestos lawsuits, said the results take on the "aspects of a lottery." Daniel
Wise, Verdicts of $31 Million in Asbestos Lawsuits; Weinstein Terms Process of Han-
dling Claims "A National Scandal," N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1991 at 1.
7. See, e.g., Calvin Sims, $9 Million Won For Loss of Arm in Drunken Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at B3 ("A dishwasher who fell onto a subway track and was hit
by a train has been awarded $9.3 million in damages even though he was drunk at the
time of the accident."). However, the New York Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, recently reversed and dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiff had
failed to prove both the breach of the duty of due care and proximate cause. See N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 7, 1996, at 25 (Francisco Merino v. New York City Transp. Auth.).
8. Stephen J. Adler, Legal Beat, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at B5. The poll was
conducted by Metricus, a California-based research firm. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bruce Hight, Punitive Awards: Burden on Economy, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN,
Apr. 6, 1994, at El ("A striking increase in the frequency and amount of punitive
damages awarded ... has created a burden on the Texas economy that is 'heavy,
pervasive and increasing,' according to a study by the Texas Public Policy Founda-
tion."); Editorial, Dollars and Damages, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1987, at A20
("[P]unitive damage awards are increasing in frequency and in dollar amount, espe-
cially when the defendant is a business or a corporation."); but see Bruce Hight &
Mary Coppinger, Questioning Tort Reform, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 1995, at
J1 ("There is no conclusive evidence.., of juries assessing excessive punitive damage
awards or that the number of such judgments is increasing, according to a study by the
American Bar Foundation .... ").
11. Delta Woodside Hit With $29.1 Million Verdict in Alabama, BLOOMBERG Bus.
NEWS, Nov. 27, 1993, at 5.
12. Id.
260 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
In a separate case, a female executive who was dismissed by the
Olsten Corporation was awarded $5.18 million in damages by a
federal jury that found the company discriminated against wo-
men.13 The plaintiff's salary at the time her employment termi-
nated was $84,000 a year.14 The award included $150,714 in back
wages, about $29,400 for pain and suffering and other losses, and
$5 million in punitive damages. 15
In another case, a $104,000-a-year construction executive was
awarded $5.1 million in damages on a claim that he had been un-
fairly pushed out of his job.16 The award included $2 million for
"emotional distress" and $1 million in punitive damages.17 Litigat-
ing such cases takes on the character of entering a lottery.18
Consequently, alternate dispute resolution is generally a better
path to take than litigation. 19 Nonetheless, alternate dispute reso-
lution is a consensual arrangement and therefore unavailable in the
absence of agreement by all parties. Even when agreement occurs,
alternate dispute resolution is like survival strategy after a
shipwreck.
In order to avoid the triage involved in both alternative dispute
resolution and litigation, top-notch executives should develop an-
13. Luciano v. The Olsten Corp., - F. Supp. -, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 613
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1996).
14. Associated Press, Jury Awards Woman $5 Million in Lawsuit Alleging "Glass
Ceiling," CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1995, at C12.
15. Luciano v. The Olsten Corp., - F. Supp. -, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 613
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1996).
16. Hunio v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 253
(2d Dist.), rev. granted, 854 P.2d 79 (Cal. 1993), transferred back, 882 P.2d 248 (Cal.
1994) (ordering vacation of judgment not on the basis of a damages issue); Theodore
J. Boutrous, Jr., Rule of Lost Your Job? Sue and Make a Million, WALL ST. J., July 28,
1993, at A15.
17. Hunio v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 253
(2d Dist.), rev. granted, 854 P.2d 79 (Cal. 1993), transferred back, 882 P.2d 248 (Cal.
1994) (ordering vacation of judgment not on the basis of a damages issue).
18. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), modified and re-
manded, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), illustrates the hazards of defending a lawsuit in
the United States. In November 1985, a Houston jury awarded Pennzoil $10.53 bil-
lion on its complaint against Texaco. The gravamen of the complaint was the accusa-
tion that Texaco had induced Getty Oil to breach an "agreement in principle" for
Pennzoil to purchase almost 43% of Getty common stock for $2.6 billion. A scholarly
analysis of the issues reveals that the award was remarkably erroneous. The manage-
ment of Pennzoil must have agreed with this assessment of the weakness of its case
because Pennzoil retained Joseph Jamail on a contingent fee basis. If Pennzoil at the
outset had confidence in its own case, it would have paid its lawyers on an hourly fee
basis. Legal fees on an hourly basis would have aggregated at most a few million
dollars. In contrast, Jamail is said to have received $600 million following a settlement
for $3 billion.
19. See Masterson, supra note 5, at S2.
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tennae which pick up legal problem warning signals. They should
understand how legal problems arise, how to spot them, how to
cope with them, how to avoid or minimize legal complexities where
possible, how to work with and manage lawyers and how to keep
legal costs down without sacrificing, and while even improving,
legal protection.
II. The Delinquent Account Receivable Problem
The following hypothetical explores the issues that business ex-
ecutives must keep in mind if they are to avoid or mitigate the
problem of a delinquent account receivable. It also illustrates how
unsatisfactory recourse to the law can be when executives fail to
anticipate legal problems.
In this hypothetical, Smith Enterprises Inc. (SEI, or, informally,
Smith), a manufacturing concern that has been in business only a
few years, but appears to be successful and is growing, received a
verbal order from Bruce Brothers Corporation (Buyer, or Bruce
Brothers) owned by Thomas and George Bruce. The order is for
$250,000 worth of goods to be manufactured to the Buyer's specifi-
cations. The goods were shipped and, although the Buyer was obli-
gated to make payment twenty days after invoice, eight months
have passed without receipt of payment.
Throughout the eight months, William Smith (Smith), the owner
of SEI, made telephone calls to the Bruce brothers to ask about
payment. The Bruce brothers would consistently respond that they
were planning to pay as soon as funds became available, but they
also made a point of saying that there was some defect in the
goods. Smith assumed that the talk about a defect in the goods was
just a red herring.
After eight months without payment, Smith has a conversation
with the Bruce brothers that makes him irate. Once again the
Bruce brothers tell Smith that the goods were defective; this time,
however, they go on to say that because they "want to be fair,"
they are willing to pay Smith $225,000 in full settlement for the
$250,000 invoice, with the $225,000 to be paid at the rate of $25,000
per month for nine months at 6% interest from the date a settle-
ment agreement is signed. Smith concluded the conversation by
telling off both Bruce brothers. He then immediately telephones
his lawyer, Albert Dunn (Dunn), and summarizes the situation, ex-
plaining that he wants legal action and that he wants it fast.
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As it turns out, Smith needs the $250,000 for working capital.
He is borrowing money from his bank at 1% over the prime rate
(which currently is 8.75%) and there is a limit on his line of credit.
Smith has a number of objectives in mind. The most important
will be for Dunn to get the $250,000 for SEI immediately, espe-
cially in view of the fact that the debt is more than eight months
overdue. Additionally, Smith will want the court to order that the
Buyer reimburse SEI for legal fees paid to Dunn and pay interest
at the same rate which Smith pays on his bank loan. Finally, Smith
will want the Buyer to pay treble damages in view of the outra-
geous and deceptive conduct on the part of Thomas and George
Bruce.
Accordingly, Smith will present the following questions to his
lawyer, Dunn:
Question No. 1: How long will it take Smith, through court
action, to get the money owed to him by Bruce Brothers?
Question No. 2: Will Bruce Brothers be ordered by the court
to pay the legal fees incurred by Smith?
Question No. 3: How does Dunn charge and what will the to-
tal legal fee be?
Question No. 4: Is Dunn willing to take the case on a contin-
gent-fee basis?
Question No. 5: Will a judgment against Bruce Brothers carry
the same rate of interest that Smith pays to his bank?
Question No. 6: Can Smith get treble damages in the suit he
is contemplating against Bruce Brothers?
Question No. 7 (the bottom line question): What should
Smith's decision be in response to the outrageous offer made by
Bruce Brothers?
1I. The Answers
1. ..How long will it take Smith, through court action, to get the
money owed to him by Bruce Brothers?
Let's face it, nothing much has changed since Shakespeare's day.
Hamlet lists the "law's delay" as one of the ordeals mankind has to
endure.2" Delay in adjudication is as certain today.21
20. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, sc. 1, line 72 (T.J.B. Spencer ed.,
Penguin Books 1980); see also, Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 212 A.2d 440, 455
(Penn. 1965) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) ("If Hamlet lamented over the 'law's delays'
[sic] in 1602, I should like to hear him on the snail's gallop of the law in 1965 ....").
21. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of
Ideal Lawsuit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 3 (1989) ("Jurists today complain about the excessive cost and the unreasonable
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Business executives often mistakenly believe they are asking a
lawyer a simple question when they inquire how long a lawsuit will
take. Most of the time a lawyer does not know the answer to a
reasonable probability.22 The length of a lawsuit will depend upon
the nature of the claim, whether, under the law governing the case,
there is a right to a trial by jury, whether the case is brought in a
Federal or State court, and if in State court, in which State and in
which part of the State. The time that it will take to reach trial will
also depend on the ability of the judge and his willingness to work
and the ability and attitude of the lawyers for the respective
parties.
Experience shows that federal and state judges consistently tol-
erate dilatory tactics, despite modern civil procedure rules in-
tended to inhibit actions taken in bad faith.23
The discovery process, for example, has been largely distorted.
It was intended to prevent surprise and give each side the advan-
tage of full preparation, but it is often abused to cause needless
delay and expense.24
delay of litigation, the result, they argue, of an overburdened court system and over-
zealous advocacy."); see also, Bill Bloomfield, Civil Lawsuit Reform, Searches, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1995, at B8 ("This plague of lawsuit abuse is choking the court system
in California, causing outrageous delays on those cases which have merit but unfortu-
nately cannot be heard in an appropriate period of time."); Mary Beth Murphy, Judge
Defies Law On Counsel for Poor Parents, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 13, 1995, at 3
(noting costly delays in Milwaukee's juvenile court system); Kevin Davis, In Loving
Hands; Woman Devoted to Caring for the Child of Her Slain Daughter, SUN-SENTI-
NEL, Jan. 31, 1995, at 1A (noting delays in criminal court system).
22. See, e.g., Junda Woo, Couple Wonder If They Will See End to Lawsuit Filed 15
Years Ago, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1994, at B5.
My own law firm represented a group of prominent investors in litigation against
the principals of the defunct Home-Stake Production Co., which had engaged in large
tax-shelter promotions. Other law firms represented other investors. A November
20, 1989 Wall Street Journal article reported the entry of judgment in the sixteen-year-
old case. Admittedly, the case had very complicated issues, involving class certifica-
tion, the liability of the lawyers who drafted the prospectus, the liability of the ac-
counting firm, multi-district problems and the extent of the exposure of the insurance
company which, although putting a relatively small cap on the exposure for any one
claim, made the mistake of not imposing a total cap for claims in the aggregate. Even
the entry of judgment did not mark the end of the legal proceedings. Settlement of
claims against the company was complicated by its bankruptcy proceedings. The
Supreme Court of the United States has twice considered various issues in the case
and now, six years after the entry of judgment, there are still unsettled issues relating
to non-settling defendants, stemming from a change in the case law, as well as new
legislation.
23. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
24. See generally, Study No. 874017 conducted by Louis Harris & Assoc., Inc. for
Aetna Life & Casualty, Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue A Sympo-
sium: Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial
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Similarly, although the rules of civil procedure make available an
expedited summary judgment in clear-cut cases, the granting of
summary judgment is rare even when warranted. 5
The reasons why judges tolerate delay and deny summary judg-
ment are manifold. Some judges are merely lazy. They shirk the
task of reading the motion papers carefully enough to resolve the
legal issues. Instead, they dismiss the application for summary
judgment with the time-worn phrase, "Triable issues of fact exist."
Some judges treat summary judgment as an infringement of a
basic civil liberty. They see summary judgment as an interference
with the sacred role of juries,26 despite the fact that for hundreds of
years in commercial cases directed verdicts and judgments notwith-
standing the jury verdict have been a part of the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition.27
The harm that results from denying a meritorious motion for
summary judgment is often significant to the outcome of a case.
The denial of summary judgment drastically alters the negotiating
Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U.L. REV.
731, 733 (1989) ("Both state and federal judges believe that abuse of the discovery
process is the most important cause of delays in litigation and of excessive costs.").
25. See Andre v. Pomeroy, 320 N.E.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. 1974) ("[A]s a practical
matter summary judgment continues to be a rare event in negligence cases."); Illinois
v. Brumfield, 390 N.E.2d 589, 594 (App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979) ("Summary judgments are
allowed on rare occasions in civil cases, but never in criminal cases."); see also,
Michael C. Silberberg, Southern District Civil Practice Roundup, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 3,
1994, at 3 (discussing refusal of Southern District of New York Judge Gerard L. Goet-
tel to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination case on the grounds
that the Second Circuit had "all but outlawed" the use of summary judgment in such
actions).
26. See Hardin v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 451 U.S. 1008 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) ("[I]t is inappropriate to resolve issues of credibility,
motive and intent on motions for summary judgment."); Lee Levine, In Memoriam:
Mark Kinloch Wilson: Article: Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the
Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 3, 53 (1985) ("The apparent conflict be-
tween the concept of summary judgment and the role of the jury in assessing witness
credibility has received the most detailed judicial attention in the context of antitrust
litigation ....").
27. William W. Schwarzer, et. al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judg-
ment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 446 (1992) (noting that summary judgment practice
was inherited from English law). The propriety of setting aside a clearly erroneous
jury verdict in an employment discrimination case is illustrated by the decision in
Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 836 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Wood, J.). The
court found that " 'there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the ver-
dict that the jury's finding could only have been the result of sheer surmise and con-
jecture.' " Id. at 164.
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position of the parties and the dollar figure in settlement talks.28
The party who should have been granted summary judgment must
now calculate the legal costs in preparing for and conducting a full-
blown trial, the loss of executive time in connection with the law-
suit and the risk of an unfavorable verdict from unpredictable
jurors.2 9
For the purpose of our exercise, let's assume that we are dealing
with a time-frame of at least three years for a lawsuit by Smith
against Bruce Brothers even if there is no appeal to a higher court
after the conclusion of the trial.3 °
2. Will Bruce Brothers be ordered by the court to pay the legal
fees incurred by Smith?
The answer is "No." If Smith wins, he will be entitled to rela-
tively minor "court costs" such as filing fees, but unless there is a
special statute that governs this particular kind of case or legisla-
tive reform is accomplished, he will have to pay his own attorney
fees.3'
Obviously, the fees of the attorney for Smith can be quite sub-
stantial in relation to the matter in controversy,32 especially if after
28. See generally, Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990) (analyzing the effect of summary
judgment on settlement negotiations).
29. To cite one of many such experiences, our firm brought a motion for summary
judgment in an antitrust suit instituted against our client in the field of radio commu-
nications equipment. Summary judgment for the defendant was granted on the plain-
tiff's count of monopoly but was denied on the count of attempt to monopolize. At
the conclusion of the ensuing trial, the jury found for the plaintiff but the judge prop-
erly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The victory was welcome but sub-
stantial legal expense to our client was entailed in the preparation and conduct of the
trial and valuable executive time was lost.
30. Jury cases in urban centers average five years before trial is reached. RAND
CORPORATION INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 1991-2 (1992).
31. Contrary to the rule in most major legal systems, American law provides that
the winning party must pay its own legal fees, unless a special statute applies to the
subject matter of the litigation. The American rule was first articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see generally,
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 329-30 (1991) (discussing fee shift-
ing practices in European countries); L. Gordon Crovitz, Rule of The More Lawsuits
the Better and Other American Notions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1991, at A15.
32. A number of illustrations of how substantial legal fees mount up in defending
a plainly unmeritorious case have arisen in my practice. In one case, a claim was
made against a client of ours for human rights discrimination. Complaints were filed
successively before the Human Rights Commission, the EEOC and in a civil suit in
which the plaintiff appeared pro se. The federal judge leaned over backwards in favor
of the plaintiff in the conduct of the court proceedings, although he eventually dis-
missed the claim in no uncertain terms. Under the law, the plaintiff had several bites
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suit has been filed, there is an eventual settlement for considerably
less than the amount that was owed.
3. How does Dunn charge and what will the total legal fee be?
Since Smith has been told that even if he wins the lawsuit Bruce
Brothers will not be required to pay the legal fees incurred by
Smith, he now proceeds to ask how much it will cost him in legal
fees if he sues Bruce Brothers.
The lawyer not unexpectedly tells Smith that he cannot come up
with a figure because the time a lawyer will spend.in litigation will
vary considerably, depending upon whether settlement is worked
out before trial, whether the lawyer will have to make preliminary
court motions or cope with motions brought by the other side,
whether or not Bruce Brothers will assert a counterclaim, the
amount of time consumed in depositions and in other forms of dis-
covery, etc.
Since the total fee cannot be estimated, the next inquiry will be
the hourly rate charged by Dunn. Hourly rate billing is now com-
mon for lawyers handling complex commercial matters. But the
business executive usually finds the amount charged to be astonish-
ing and the lawyer himself often does a double-take when he looks
at his bookkeeper's tabulation of time charges.33
4. Is Dunn willing to take the case on a contingency fee basis?
In view of Dunn's hourly rate and the uncertainty as to the
amount of legal time that the case may take, a good question for
Smith to pose is whether Dunn would be willing to handle the case
on a contingency fee basis. From Smith's point of view such an
arrangement would have two advantages as against the possibility
or even likelihood that he would end up paying a higher fee than if
he paid Dunn on an hourly basis: first, if the suit should be lost or
of the apple. The fact that the Human Rights Commission had found against the
plaintiff did not forestall or end the complaint before another tribunal. In fact, a
complaint had also been made to the New York State Attorney General and the last
turn of the screw was an inquiry by the United States Department of Labor which
insisted that it had to make its own determination despite the fact that plaintiff's
claim was found baseless in all of the prior proceedings.
33. Consequently, businesses are imposing restraints on the hourly billing system.
Steve Hirsch, Is There a Lawyer in the House?; Study Targets Midsize Firms, THE
RECORD, Oct. 22, 1995, at B1 ("Perhaps the most radical change in the legal market-
place has been clients [sic] willingness to challenge the traditional hourly billing sys-
tem that most law firms employ."); Weaver H. Gaines, Legal Services as Products,
THE CONN. LAW TRIB., May 22, 1995, at 8 (1995) ("Increasingly, clients are demand-
ing that lawyers bid for business based on a fixed price.").
266
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settled for a low amount, Smith will save money by the arrange-
ment, and second, Smith, except for disbursements for costs, will
not be out-of-pocket any further until he collects on the judgment
against Bruce Brothers.
Although Dunn desires to please Smith, his answer as to whether
he would take the case on a contingency fee basis probably will be
"No." Lawyers with expertise in commercial cases generally be-
lieve that it is undesirable to conduct a commercial case on a con-
tingency fee basis. This point is illustrated by the Vendo-Stoner
case that took .17 years to resolve. 4 Although the suit was ulti-
mately successful, the final settlement did not provide appropriate
compensation for Vendo's lawyer. He represented the plaintiff on
a contingency fee basis and over the years had been paid only out-
of-pocket expenses. When the settlement was agreed to, Vendo's
lawyer stated: "If you look back over all these years, and you ana-
lyze the hourly rates, you find it's less than the rates I used to get as
a caddie. 35
As Smith pauses to digest the unwelcome input he has received
in response to his questions, Dunn has a question of his own that
he has been waiting to ask: how vulnerable is Smith to a counter-
claim for a defect in the goods.
After Smith responds with some details and voices his conclusion
that there is very little merit to the contention that the goods were
defective, Dunn points out (for future guidance and not to rub salt
in Smith's wounds) that a written sales contract can protect a seller
by setting a short period within which any claim for a defect must
be made, and more importantly, can limit the seller's potential lia-
34. Erik Larson, Flash: California Suit Has Finale-1 7 Years After It Was Brought,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1983, at 15.
35. Id. Of course personal injury lawyers almost invariably work on a contingent
fee basis and want it that way, usually for their own benefit, especially when liability
on the part of the defendant appears to be clear and the recovery is likely to be large.
See also Crovitz, supra note 31, at A15.
Our firm represented a plaintiff on a contingency fee basis in an antitrust action
after the U.S. Department of Justice had found an antitrust violation in the syndica-
tion of comic strips. Although the case looked like a surefire winner, it turned into a
long, drawn-out affair. The relevant events had taken place a number of years before
the institution of suit and, therefore, it was necessary to develop the case through
subpoenas for deposition testimony of non-party witnesses located in various south-
eastern states. Furthermore, the wealthy defendants contested everything from juris-
diction and venue to virtually every aspect of the discovery process, consuming an
inordinate amount of legal resources. Although a reasonable settlement was eventu-
ally arrived at, it taught us- to leave the contingency fee cases to the personal injury
practitioners, even though on occasion contingency fee cases are more lucrative.
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bility for damages in a number of significant ways.3 6 After discus-
sion, Smith and Dunn agree that although the odds are high that
Bruce Brothers cannot make a counterclaim stick, if the counter-
claim were to be successful, the damages that might be awarded on
the counterclaim could be higher than the amount due Smith on
the invoice.
5. Will a judgment against Bruce Brothers carry the same rate of
interest that Smith pays to his bank?
Again the answer will not be to Smith's liking. Dunn will explain
that state law fixes the interest rate on a contract claim37 and that
most of the time, at least when interest rates are high, the rate of
interest that is payable on the judgment amount may well be below
the prevailing interest rate. Assume that Smith currently borrows
at one point above the prime rate, the prime rate being set hypo-
thetically at 8.75%.
Smith was supposed to have been paid twenty days after ship-
ment. Eight months have passed and if Smith proceeds with litiga-
tion it will take at least three more years before Smith can secure
and collect a judgment. The judgment will carry interest from the
date twenty days after the shipment of the goods, but if Smith de-
cides to prosecute the lawsuit, he probably will lose the interest
differential for at least three years.
6. Can Smith get treble damages in the suit he is contemplating
against Bruce Brothers?
Smith feels that he has been chiselled by a pro. He is irate. The
answer to the question as to his right to treble damages will do
nothing to improve his mood. Although there is a growing (and
unfortunate) practice nowadays on the part of judges to permit ju-
ries to tack on punitive damages in a routine tort claim, punitive
damages generally are not awarded in debt collection suits like this
one.38 Despite Smith's indignation at the conduct of the Bruce
brothers, there was no ostensible fraud on their part. The case ba-
36. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by
agreement ... ."); U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (permitting limitation of warranty provision);
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) ("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement .... ").
37. E.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5001 (McKinney 1991).
38. Under New York law, for example, punitive damages "cannot be granted for
failure to perform the obligations of a private agreement, even if the failure to per-
form was purposeful and in bad faith." Morano v. Oral Research Laboratories, Inc.,
594 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261 (1st Dept. 1993).
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sically will be a routine collection action brought by one corpora-
tion against another.
7. (the bottom line question): What should Smith's decision be
in response to the outrageous offer made by Bruce
Brothers?
After the foregoing discussion with Dunn, Smith must decide
how to respond to the Bruce brothers, who had pretty much indi-
cated that their offer of $225,000 to settle the $250,000 invoice, pay-
able at the rate of $25,000 a month for nine consecutive months
with interest at the rate of 6%, was a take-it-or-leave-it proposi-
tion. As Smith, what is your decision? War or peace? Litigation
or settlement?
As a prudent executive, Smith concludes that he cannot afford
the luxury of taking Bruce Brothers to court. Accordingly, he de-
cides to accept the settlement offer.
The Settlement Agreement
Assume that Smith and Dunn may fashion the settlement agree-
ment in any reasonable manner, because the Bruce brothers are
fully satisfied with the delay they have achieved, the additional
time they are getting, and the $25,000 concession.
Smith would be well advised to settle for the performance of the
obligations of Bruce Brothers under the settlement agreement and
not for the promise of that performance. This is the difference be-
tween an accord and satisfaction and an executory accord.39 Smith
will be much better protected if the agreement stipulates that the
entire $250,000 is owed to him, but that the debt will be discharged
by the timely payment on the dates specified of $225,000 with
interest.
Otherwise, Smith would be vulnerable to future default by Bruce
Brothers. If Bruce Brothers should fail to pay promptly the install-
ments aggregating $225,000 as scheduled in the original settlement
agreement, Smith might be faced with a demand for another con-
cession in the sum to be paid in exchange for the prompt payment
of the sum then due. If the Bruce brothers are now acting in good
faith, they should have no objection to affording Smith the lever-
age of an acknowledgment that he is entitled to the entire original
amount if Bruce Brothers does not live up to the terms of the set-
39. See generally, Comment, Executory Accord, Accord and Satisfaction and Nova-
tion-The Distinctions, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 185 (1974).
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tlement agreement.4 0 To complete this approach to the settlement,
there should also be an acknowledgment by Bruce Brothers that
the goods complied with specifications.4
Obtaining a down payment should be a priority issue in finaliz-
ing the settlement agreement. We will assume, however, that
Bruce Brothers refuses to make a down payment.
In considering the provisions that should be contained in the set-
tlement agreement, it is insufficient simply to state that nine pay-
ments, each in the amount of $25,000, will be made by Bruce
Brothers in consecutive monthly intervals, starting one month from
now, with interest from the present date at the rate of six per cent
per annum.
The settlement agreement must also specify when interest is to
be paid and on what amount. If interest is to be paid each month,
40. A case that my firm handled is germane. Our client ("Baker") was the chief
executive in a shaky magazine empire ("X Corporation") who had an employment
agreement that over time would have paid him $1 million. The controlling stockhold-
ers concluded that the magazine corporation should be sold to another magazine en-
terprise. In order to achieve this, the controlling stockholders had to persuade Baker,
who was also a minor stockholder in X Corporation, to go along with the merger. The
proposal to Baker included an agreement under which he would render nominal serv-
ices as a consultant to the new enterprise ("Newco") and would be paid aggregate
consulting fees totalling only' half of what he would have received if his employment
agreement had been honored by X Corporation. For good reasons, Baker decided to
go along with the transaction. On behalf of the client, we insisted that the following
provision be inserted in the consulting contract between Newco and him:
"Remedies. Newco and Consultant [Baker] expressly acknowledge and
agree that, in the event of any breach of the terms hereof by Newco, which
breach remains unremedied 5 days after notice thereof is given to Newco by
the Consultant, the Consultant shall be entitled to (a) damages equal to such
amounts as would be due Consultant if Consultant were employed by Newco
upon terms identical to that certain employment agreement, dated __
between Consultant and X Corporation, and if Consultant's employment
had been terminated by Newco without cause and (b) reasonable legal fees
resulting from a breach involving non-payment of amounts owed
hereunder."
After a period of time, Newco stopped making payments on the consulting agree-
ment and accordingly it was necessary to bring suit on behalf of Baker. Fortunately,
however, by reason of the provision of the consulting agreement quoted above, my
firm was able to get a judgment for the client for a million dollars rather than for half
a million dollars.
41. In my practice I represented a South Carolina manufacturer of menswear.
One day the executive of the company called me and stated that there had been a
dispute with a customer about whether shipped goods met specifications, etc., and
that a settlement had been proposed that would (a) fix a lesser amount in full satisfac-
tion and (b) be payable in installments. Pursuant to my advice, the client insisted on a
settlement predicated on actual performance rather than on the promise of that
performance.
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it should be on the entire unpaid balance and not just on the partic-
ular installment of the principal then falling due.
The settlement agreement should also contain an acceleration
upon default provision, providing that the entire amount will im-
mediately become due and payable upon certain types of default
on the installment payments. A provision requiring prior notice
before acceleration is often included in such clauses.
Another feature of the settlement agreement should be a provi-
sion entitling Smith to a higher rate of interest (perhaps the then
current market rate of interest) commencing upon the date of any
default. A higher rate of interest fairly reflects Smith's concession
to swallow the low six per cent rate of interest only as long as there
is no default.
There are other items that would make the settlement more at-
tractive for Smith, such as security or a personal guaranty by the
Bruce brothers. We mentioned that the law generally does not
award legal fees to the prevailing party. An agreement in the event
of default to pay the other side's legal fees and the costs of collec-
tion is enforceable 2 and Smith should ask for such a provision in
the settlement papers.
Smith should also seek a confession of judgment. This is a device
provided by law in a number of states43 to expedite legal action and
to minimize the cost of collecting a debt. that admittedly is due or
will become due upon a stated default.
There are a number of subsidiary issues not answered here.
Should Smith avoid telling people, either before or after he collects
the $225,000, that the Bruce brothers are deadbeats? How should
Smith respond if, some time after the debt is fully paid, Smith gets
a phone call from one of the Bruce brothers who desires to place
an order for another $250,000 of merchandise? Should Smith tell
the Bruce brother to get lost? Or should Smith agree to the order
but require: (1) a large deposit with the order, (2) cash on delivery,
(3) collateral, (4) a letter of credit, (5) a personal guaranty, (6) a
higher price than would be charged to another customer?
42. See Resnick v. Maxim Group, Inc., 633 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (4th Dept. 1995)
("Because... defendants are in default under the settlement agreement [they] must
pay plaintiff costs and attorney's fees."); see also, Raven Elevator Corp. v. Finkelstein,
636 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1st Dept. 1996) (enforcing personal guaranty).
43. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Pollack, 617 N.Y.S.2d 344.(2dDept. 1994); World Color,
Inc. v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1st Dept. 1992).
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Conclusion
Since the American civil legal system is unsatisfactorily costly,
slow and risky, a top business executive, as part of his main pur-
suits, should adopt the habit of a good commercial lawyer of giving
thought to potential legal problems in a commercial relationship.
In an attempt to avoid having an unfortunate experience such as
Smith's, the prudent business executive should investigate all the
parties to a contemplated transaction and should refuse to do busi-
ness with anyone who has a reputation for being a dead-beat or for
otherwise causing trouble. With any sizeable order for the ship-
ment of goods, it is desirable to secure a down payment. Further-
more, taking the precaution of entering into a written contract
should help considerably in avoiding legal disputes or bringing
them to a satisfactory conclusion.
In the context of a delinquent accounts receivable, a business
executive attempting to collect a valid debt on an oral agreement
frequently will come to the unhappy conclusion that he or she is
well advised to settle, not litigate. In our hypothetical involving a
delinquent account receivable aggregating $250,000, Smith should
make an effort as part of the settlement to procure a down pay-
ment of an amount between $25,000 and $35,000. We conclude
that regardless of Smith's success in that regard, Smith should ac-
cept the settlement offer by the debtor Bruce Brothers.
Any settlement agreement concerning debt collection generally
should constitute an accord and satisfaction of prior debts, not an
executory accord. The agreement should set forth the installment
payment arrangements, including when interest will be paid and on
what amount, an acceleration upon default provision, a higher rate
of interest upon default, and a confession of judgment. Desirable
provisions also include a down payment, security, a personal guar-
anty, and payment of legal fees and costs of collection in the event
of default.
After this distressing encounter, Smith is determined in future
business dealings to try to anticipate and to prevent the occurrence
of any costly and troublesome legal problem that can be adroitly
avoided.
